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Key points : In the past ３０ years , the HCRS ( household‐contract responsibility system ) has made a great contribution to thedevelopment of China . Although it is a successful practice in rural areas , it has its defects , especially in pastoral areas . Thissystem leads to grassland fragmentation and possibly results in degradations of grassland ecosystem . This paper analyses a new
practice , which is an institutional innovation of HCRS by herdsmen : household‐allied operation system ( HAOS ) . HAOSencourage herdsmen to cooperate for grassland use and management . Under this system , the productivity is improved , humanresources are developed , herdsmen摧s per capita income is increased , and , more importantly , it results in rotational grazing that
protects the ecosystem of grassland .
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Introduction
The household‐contract responsibility system ( HCRS) of rural areas , as a symbol of China摧s Reforming and Opening‐up policy ,has not only increased farmers�working enthusiasm and initiative , but also improved agricultural productivity . HCRS solvedChina摧s food security problems and made a great contribution to the development of rural areas . HCRS is the fundamentalinstitutional arrangement and provides the institutional foundation of other rural policies . This system was gradually adopted inthe pastoral areas in the late １９８０s in China . There exist many arguments about this system . This study analyzes five separatecases in Xilinguole League , Inner Mongolia , of the institutional performance and effectiveness of an innovative institution ofhousehold‐allied operation system ( HAOS) . The historical evolution of the grassland household‐contract management system isreviewed and the problems are discussed , and five cases are studied to illustrate the effectiveness of HAOS . Finally theconclusion is reached that under the framework of HCRS , the grasslands are possibly overgrazed and degenerated , but adoption ofHAOS can help to solve the problem of degradation and protect the ecosystem of pastoral areas .
Historical process of grassland HCRS
Before １９４９ , most pastoral areas in China were operated under a feudal system where most of the grasslands were owned by thetribe . Under this condition , few lords had the property rights and tribal members , instead of owning the land , could just usethe grassland . Since the １９５０s , the commune system has been put into practice where grasslands were owned by the state andoperated collectively . Since the beginning of the reform in １９７８ , the household‐contract responsibility system has successfullyspread in China . Nowadays , grassland ownership is based on the HCRS , which means grassland is owned by the communityand is contracted to the herdsman households to use . This process evolved over three stages : (１) f rom the early to the end ofthe １９８０s , only livestock were given to herdsmen by contract ; ( ２ ) from the end of the １９８０s to the mid １９９０s , most of thegrasslands were contracted to a group in the village ; ( ３ ) from mid １９９０s to now , grasslands were contracted to households( Awangjiancuo , ２００４) . There are four steps in the dispensing process : the first is surveying to clarify the boundary of thegrassland among different villages ; the second is developing household contract scenarios and dispensing the grassland to thehouseholds after the plan has been approved by herdsman摧s convention ; the third is signing contracts with each household ; thefinal step is issuing certification to the households .
Different weights are given to the number of livestock owned by households and number of people in the households inallocation of grasslands . There exist two types : ４０％ weights for livestock number and ６０％ for number of people , or ３０％weights for livestock and ７０％ for people . The duration of a contract is between ３０ and ５０ years . Archives of the contract arekept by the grassland supervising organization or the agri‐animal husbandry bureau of local governments . So far , total areas ofcontracted grassland in China are more than ２００ million hectares . Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region ( IMAR) is one of themost successful provinces regarding this . From １９８２ to the end of ２００６ , the household contracted grassland reached ５３ millionhectares , nearly ８０％ of the grassland usable in Inner Mongolia .
Problems faced by grassland household‐contract responsibility system
Grassland HCRS , on one hand , promotes the development of livestock husbandry of pastoral areas . On the other hand , it canlead to heavy grassland degradation . It has been found to negatively affect the grassland ecosystem ( Ao Renqi , ２００４ ) . Thereexist three problems with this system : First , it leads to grassland fragmentation and heavy environmental degradations . Afterdispensing grasslands to households , grasslands were segmented into small pieces with each household grazing on only a very
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small area . Therefore , this system makes it difficult to conduct rotational grazing and accelerates grassland degradation .Second , the function of communities can not be realized . After the reform , herdsmen worked on their own grassland separatelyand the relationship among them was looser . This negatively affected the communities�supervision function . It is difficult toex tend new grazing technologies because of less cooperation among households after the reform . Furthermore , some of theherdsmen rent out their grasslands and it is difficult to restrict the renters�overgrazing behavior . Third , it leads to highproduction costs and low incomes of herdsmen . The small scale of grassland makes it difficult to allocate the human resourcesoptimally . Roughly ９０％ of domestic usable natural grasslands have been degraded , including ５７％ light degraded , ３１％medium degraded and １２％ heavy degraded ( Yang Li ,２００６) .
Some researchers think that the reasons for the above problems are the limitations and defects of the grassland household‐contract responsibility system , and they provide a solution of �grassland as stock share" management system ( Ao Renqi , １９８９ ,
２００ ) . Bao Yushan claimed to use a collective system (２００３) : the village has the rights to make contracts regarding managementpractices , and resume nomadic grazing at the same time . Yang Li ( ２００６ ) believes it is important to encourage herdsmen tocooperate in grassland use after the initial allocation of grassland property rights . Experiences from other countries suggest thatit is impossible to realize sustainable development of grasslands without development of a comprehensive property rightsinstitution ( Fernandez Gimenez , M . E . , ２００１ , ２００２ , ２００４ ; Casimir , M .J . １９９２ ; Mearns , R .J . １９９６ .) .
We believe that the current grassland HCRS really has some defects , however , herdsmen have found some solutions in
practice . This paper , based on five cases in the Xilinguole League Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region , analyzes thedevelopment of a household‐allied operation system and its characteristics . This analysis casts new insights on the institutionalinnovation of HCRS .
Case Studies
Case １ : Saiyin Baolige Haote , Xianghuang Banner of Xilinguole League , Inner Mongolia
There were originally seven households in the area . Since serious degradation and low possibility of increasing income fromlivestock husbandry , two households moved to urban areas af ter renting out grassland to their neighbors . The other fivehouseholds , ２４ people in total , grazing on less than １０００ hectares of grassland chose HAOS for management . There are in total
６００ head of livestock in this area . The amount of livestock that each household can raise is determined by the capacity of their
grassland and the magnitude of grassland they have contracted . The grassland has been separated into winter grazing area ,summer grazing area and collective grass harvesting area , which is used for hay stockpiling for winter time feeding . Now ,rotational grazing has been realized in this area . The average income per capita in the village has increased by １０００ ChineseYuan .
Case ２ : Benhong guole Gacha , Xianghuang Banner of Xilinguole League , Inner Mongolia
There are six households and ９００ hectares of grassland in this group . Most of the grasslands are highland and desertification
grassland . Since the higher fence input cost and lower grassland area per capita after HCRS , local people made the decision toadopt HAOS after １９９５ . Thereaf ter , they constructed fences for the grassland area of the whole group rather than for eachfamily . The amount of livestock each household can raise is determined by the capacity of grassland and the area of grasslandcontracted . The grassland was divided into winter grazing areas and summer grazing areas . Now , grass mowing and grazing areoperated collectively , and forage production , stud stock purchasing are operated separately by households . Herdsmen purchase
production facilities together and use them as common property . Grazing heads of each household are supervised both by officialdepartment and by other households in the community . As a result , grassland desertification has been prevented gradually . Atthe same time , cooperation among households has led to labor saving , surplus labor has moved to urban areas to make money ,and per capita income has been greatly increased .
Case ３ : Baiyinxile Haote , Xianghuang Banner of Xilinguole League , Inner Mongolia
There are six households , ２３ people , more than ８００ head of livestock and ８００ hectares grassland in this Haote . From early
２００６ , HAOS has been put into use in this area , and it only needs one person to manage the grassland . The other herdsmenmoved to the city to find jobs . This increased income by １５００ RMB per capita per year . From the beginning of ２００８ , the local
people are planning to use rotational grazing to protect grassland .
Case ４ : Zhenbulinyin Gacha , East Wuzhumuqin Banner of Xilinguole League , Inner Mongolia
There are ４４ households , ４７ ,８００ hectares of grassland including ８ ,７００ hectares grassland without water resources in thisvillage . In １９８４ , grasslands were dispensed to households . From then on , grasslands started to be degraded heavily . FromJune of ２００５ , all of the households agreed to fence and use the ８ ,７００ hectares of grasslands without water resources as commonmowing grassland . It can be used as the source of hay and it has saved more than ５００ RMB for grass cost in the winter time .
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The use of the common mowing area is supervised by each family and each household can only raise a certain number of animalsthat their grassland can support . Households will receive fines if overgrazing of grassland is detected . This style of householdcooperation not only decreased the grazing cost but also helped the ecosystem recover in pastoral areas .
Case ５ : Shutu Gacha , West Wuzhumuqin Banner of Xilinguole League , Inner Mongolia
The initiator of the HAOS in this Gacha is Batu . At the beginning , he cooperated with his neighbors for grassland managementand grazing because he had only a small amount of labor and grassland . In ２００６ , two other households entered into arcooperation group . There are ２ ,０００ head of livestock in this group . In order to save labor cost , they chose two people fromtheir group to supervise the grazing . The HAOS reduced labor and production costs . It also resulted in rotational grazing that
prevented the grassland from being overgrazed .
However , this cooperation group was disbanded . The reasons are as follows : firstly , there was no w ritten contract among thehouseholds in the cooperation group ; secondly , since it was hard to divide the work clearly for livestock husbandry production ,households always argued about their production cost and benefit allocation ; thirdly , it was not easy to find an availabledistribution system that made each household satisfied .
Main characteristics of Household‐allied Operation System
Through the above cases we can conclude that HAOS means at least two households reach agreement , based on HCRS , to usegrassland , labor and production facilities cooperatively . The main characteristics for HAOS are as follows :
The core foundation of Household‐allied operation system is HCRS Policy .
From ３０ years of experience , HCRS has proved to be a successful institution with low exchange fees and clear property rights .Under this system , the benefits of herdsmen can be guaranteed . Grassland , as a natural resource , was believed to be a resourcethat could be used forever before the reform . However , af ter HCRS herdsmen received their certificate of grassland usufruct ,they started to realize that there is no possibility to augment the area of their grasslands in the following ３０ years . Grassland ,instead of being a public good , became private property , just like their livestock . After HAOS , in order to protect theircontracted grassland , each household has the incentive to restrict their head of livestock . It is easy to make a conclusion thatcertificate of grassland usufruct ( clarified property rights) is the most important institution for grassland protection and benefitallocation .
The main tie of HAOS is geo‐relationship and kin‐relationship .
In the above five cases , nearly all of the cooperation groups of HAOS were combined with several neighbors or families . Underthis circumstance , it is easy for households to communicate and the bargaining cost is lower . Therefore , geo‐relationship andkin‐relationship are the most important preconditions of HAOS .
The main principle of HAOS is willingness , equality and mutual benefit .
Households can enter the HAOS if they can reach agreement with their members ; no one has the right to force them . Eachhousehold in the cooperation group has equal rights and it is an organization mutual benefit .
The key point of sustainable development of HAOS is clear definition of rights , the responsibilities , and the benefits for eachcooperator .
In the production of livestock husbandry , some of the production factors are more suitable for using and managing collectivelyand some are more suitable to be used separately . In case ２ , herdsmen use grassland collectively and raise their livestockseparately . Grass reaping and grazing are more efficient if collectively operated , and stud stock purchasing and animal feedingare more efficient individually . On the contrary , the reason of HAOS failure in case ５ is lack of clear responsibilities and benefitallocation systems . It can be concluded that the key point of sustainable development of HAOS is clear definition of rights ,responsibilities and the benefit allocation for each cooperator .
The main purpose of HAOS is using the grassland scientifically .
Rotational grazing is a method that reduces desertification and realizes a balance of capacity of grassland and number oflivestock . It can not only improve the benign interactions between the livestock and ecosystem , but also make the value ofoutput of one closed system greater than its input . The above cases proved that HAOS can make the fragmental grasslands beused collectively , and realize rotational grazing . Thus , HAOS is a scientific institution for ecosystem improvements in pastoralareas .
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Effectiveness of Household‐allied Operation System
We can make a conclusion from the above case analysis , that HAOS can not only protect ecosystem by solving the paradox oflivestock and grassland , but also save labor resources and provide an opportunity to increase per capita income .
HAOS is the essential method to protect ecosystem and increase income of local people
Firstly , this system protected the ecosystem by using the grassland resources scientifically . HAOS provided a way to improvethe environment by realizing rotational grazing on the combined small pieces of grasslands by using them collectively . Inaddition , an overload of livestock can be controlled by supervision by the herdsmen who enrolled in the HAOS . It solved theparadox between livestock and grassland and held back the tendency , to some extent , of degradation of grassland .Furthermore , the population on grassland can be reduced because HAOS saved labor resources and led more pastoral residentsto move to cities .
Secondly , some of the labor can be released from the livestock husbandry to pursue work in other industries to increase theirincome . The production cost , by using HAOS , was also reduced since the fence and production facilities come into common useand their cost was shared by households in the cooperation group .
Thirdly , the livestock husbandry management transformed from traditional style to specialized and industrialized modules .Grassland is used collectively by the members of HAOS , which is easier for the adoption of new technologies . At the sametime , rotational grazing specialized production for forages and industrialized management for livestock husbandry can berealized .
Herdsmen摧s quality and ability could be improved and social benefit could be increased by adopting HAOS .
In order to help the surplus labor of pastoral areas move out to find work , the government provided training courses for them .Herdsmen摧s quality and the local residents�income have been improved . Furthermore , HAOS reduced the transaction costsduring the management and production processes and increased the social welfare for all .
Conclusions
Although the household‐contract responsibility system of grassland cannot guarantee equality in pastoral areas , it will possiblylead to grassland degradation at the same time . The household‐allied operation system , as an institutional innovation of HCRS ,can solve the problem of grassland degradation with the practice of �number of grazing animal up to capacity of grassland" , butthe precondition is HCRS . It is believed the government should adopt the HAOS based on HCRS .
Our first recommendation to the government is to develop detailed models of HAOS based on HCRS for different areas ;secondly , reinforce the development of HAOS institutions in the pastoral areas ; thirdly , reinforce the farmers�vocationaltraining in the pastoral areas and , finally , strengthen the community supervision function of grassland use .
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